An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a recruiter, most likely a young woman, based in China. The opportunity to make around £20,000 part-time writing a handful of geopolitical reports for a firm from China peppered with confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, military and scientific classified information. But a new campaign aimed at elected officials and parliament has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying alert was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anybody who might provide information.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service knew its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the wider public better identify interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the impact of flushing out additional details from in and around parliament, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The agency wants public figures to understand that simply because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service believed to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed previous legislation led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face significant legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Risks
In part there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean someone quickly marginal turning significant.
Another way to think about the continuous efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the west at a level under the point of direct conflict. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to find secret informants on UK politics online because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate power and because it can.
